S&P/TSX 300 Companies’ Political Connections, Compliance with Board of Directors Regulations and Financial Performance by Saidatou, Hamidou Dicko & Khemakhem, Hanen
International Journal of Business and Management; Vol. 10, No. 1; 2015 
ISSN 1833-3850   E-ISSN 1833-8119 
Published by Canadian Center of Science and Education 
14 
S&P/TSX 300 Companies’ Political Connections, Compliance with 
Board of Directors Regulations and Financial Performance 
Saidatou Dicko1 & Hanen Khemakhem1 
1 Department of accounting, School of management, Université du Québec à Montréa, Canada 
Correspondence: Saidatou Dicko, Department of accounting, School of management, Université du Québec à 
Montréa, Canada. E-mail: saidatou.hamidou_dicko@uqam.ca 
 
Received: September 28, 2014      Accepted: November 18, 2014     Online Published: December 20, 2014 
doi:10.5539/ijbm.v10n1p14        URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v10n1p14 
 
Abstract 
Corporate governance best practices, especially when not mandated, usually mitigate risk and provide value 
added (Agrawal & Knober, 1996). Many authors have demonstrated a link between corporate governance and 
institutional and regulatory environments (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012; LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & 
Vishny 1998; Liu, 2006; Matoussi & Jardak, 2012) and even political power (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012). 
Political connections are known to result in numerous privileges for firms, such as decreased regulatory 
oversight (Faccio, 2006) and improved financial performance. This paper investigates compliance with 
governance regulations and political connections as separate topics, as other studies have done, but also looks at 
their combined effect by analyzing data on the financial performance of S&P/TSX companies. Our results show 
that regulatory compliance alone does not significantly impact on financial performance, political connections 
alone have a positive and very significant effect, and both factors combined have a more positive and significant 
impact than they have individually. We conclude that the analysis confirms our research hypotheses. 
Keywords: board of directors, compliance, board regulations, financial performance, governance, political 
connections, Canada 
1. Introduction  
Adoption of corporate governance best practices, especially when not mandated by the board of directors, often 
mitigates risk and provides value added (Agrawal & Knober, 1996). Numerous studies have shown the benefits 
of governance mechanisms for firms (Bonn, 2004; Bonn et al., 2004; Hartarska, 2005; Oxelheim & Randoy, 
2003; Leng, 2004; Klein et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2006; Bozec & Dia, 2007). The most important mechanism, 
the board of directors, has been investigated extensively but without any consensus among authors. Some studies 
demonstrated that boards of directors often consist of members with common social networks and connections, 
as well as economic, political and social connections (Maman, 2000; Dicko, 2011, Dicko & Breton, 2013b). 
These characteristics may be more influential than others, such as board independence, for example. 
We know that political connections can result in numerous advantages and privileges for firms, such as less 
regulatory oversight (Faccio, 2006) and improved financial performance (Dinc, 2005; Charumilind, Kali, & 
Wiwattanakantang, 2006; Faccio, 2006; Claessens, Underhill, & Zang, 2008; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009; 
Dicko & Breton, 2013a; Dicko & El Ibrami, 2013). Many authors have demonstrated a link between corporate 
governance and institutional and regulatory environments (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012; LaPorta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 1998; Liu, 2006; Matoussi & Jardak, 2012), and even political power 
(Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012)  
Since the literature addresses only the positive effects of complying with governance regulations or having 
political connections, this paper proposes to investigate the combined effect of political connections and 
compliance with board of director regulations, drawing on data on the financial performance of S&P/TSX 
companies. In the Canadian context, board of director regulations are not usually enforceable, but compliance 
yields more benefits than non-compliance; hence the relevance of investigating the behaviour of politically 
connected firms and its impact on their financial performance. 
The following topics are presented in the next sections: institutional context, theoretical foundations, literature 
review and hypotheses, research methodology, results and the conclusion and discussion. 
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2. Institutional Context and Regulations 
Since 2000, United States of America (USA) and Canadian regulation of financial reporting and financial markets 
has undergone a significant overhaul (Carnaghan & Gunz, 2007).  
Prior to these changes, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) had implemented the recommendations of the Dey 
Report, based on the conclusions of a committee of inquiry helmed by Peter Dey (Note 1). The TSE’s approach 
was founded on self-regulation, with no prescriptions to conform to the report’s guidelines (Rousseau & Talbot, 
2007). 
In response to the sense of crisis in 2002 following the collapse of Enron and SOX (Note 2) implementation in 
United States, a series of national policies and regulations was instituted in 2004 and 2005 to regulate certain 
governance practices in Canada; most notably National Instrument 52-110 Audit Committees and National 
Policy 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines. These regulations apply to all listed companies in Canada and 
contain recommendations about the nature and operations of the board of directors. 
The prescriptive regulation, National Instrument 52-110 on Audit Committees, became mandatory beginning on 
the first annual meeting held after July 2004, with the final deadline being July 2005. 
The reform’s most tolerant aspect is reflected in National Policy (NP) 58-201 Corporate Governance Guidelines, 
which came into force in June 2005. The policy recommends governance best practices such as board and 
chairperson independence, in camera for independent administrators, and the establishment of a written charter 
delineating the board’s role. As with prior TSX governance disclosure requirements, NP 58-201 is based on a 
disclosure-oriented approach, requiring boards of directors to indicate their compliance with best practices 
guidelines. Although boards do not need to comply with the governance guidelines, they do need to disclose, for 
each guideline, whether they are in compliance, the reasons for any deviations, and what the board does as an 
alternative to fulfilling the guidelines. Investors may then make their own decisions about the effectiveness of 
the corporate governance practices of each company (Carnaghan & Gunz, 2007). 
2.1 Theoretical Foundations 
From agency theory, the role of the board of directors is to protect shareholder interests by acting as a watchdog. 
Directors therefore hire, orient, control and monitor executive managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
According to the tenets of resource dependence theory, directors have a resource connection role, allowing firms 
to access key resources they need (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). These could be any type of resources, including 
expertise, competencies, financial, and so forth.  
In his social capital theory (Bourdieu, 1986; 2000), Bourdieu argues that individuals gain access to various 
resources from their social relationships or networks. For our purposes, it follows that directors must first 
establish social networks before the firm is in a position to gain access to resources from these networks. Hence, 
the possession of political connections is a mean by which firms gain access to resources (Faccio, 2006; Dicko & 
Breton, 2013a; 2013b; Dicko & El Ibrami, 2013). For example, Faccio (2006) concluded that politically 
connected firms may enjoy lower taxes, preferential treatment in government bidding or more relaxed regulatory 
oversight than non-connected firms.  
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Studies on board connections often focus on economic connections such as board interlocking. The positive 
impact of such connections on firms has been amply demonstrated (Koenig et al., 1979; Burt, 1980; Mintz & 
Schwartz, 1981; Mariolis & Jones, 1982; Ornstein, 1984; Richardson, 1987; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988; Lang & 
Lockhart, 1990; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). 
More recently, research has reported the positive effect of political connections. Charumilind et al. (2006) found 
that politically connected Thai companies have greater access to long-term debt than non-connected firms. 
Claessens et al. (2008) studied a sample of Brazilian firms, noting that those that contributed to the coffers of 
elected officials during the 1998 and 2002 electoral races experienced higher market returns than 
non-contributors. Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) examined the effect of the political connections of S&P 500 
companies and concluded that firms that appointed a politically connected director to their board experienced 
market returns at the time of the nomination announcement. Further, companies connected to the Republic Party 
at the time of the 2000 USA elections increased in value, while those connected to the Democratic Party had the 
opposite experience. Dicko and Breton (2013) studied an Osiris database sample of the top 100 Canadian firms 
and found that directors’ political connections have a positive and significant link to financial performance 
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(measured by return on assets). Similarly, working with a random sample of 300 Canadian companies listed in 
Compustat, Dicko & El Ibrami (2013) concluded that directors’ political connections have a positive and 
significant influence on long-term debt increase. 
Several studies have shown that institutions and laws regulating the financial market are associated with its 
development (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1997, 2006). Others demonstrated the positive effect 
of respecting corporate governance rules. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) concluded that the size and 
independence of the audit committee is negatively related to cost of debt. Defond, Hann and Hu (2005) found that 
the financial market reacts favourably to the appointment of a financial expert to the board of directors. Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) stated that share prices increase when companies appoint outside directors. Khemakhem and 
Naciri (2013) demonstrated that compliance with audit committee’s regulation lowers equity capital costs for 
Canadian listed companies.  
Based on the foregoing information, we formulated the following hypothesis: 
H1: Political connections and compliance with board of director regulations result in positive impacts on firm 
financial performance. 
This first hypothesis implies that: 
H2: Political connections without compliance with board of directors’ regulations impact less positively on firm 
financial performance. 
H3: Compliance with board of directors’ regulations without political connections impacts less positively on firm 
financial performance. 
4. Research Methodology 
4.1 Research Sample  
We examined a sample of TSX 300 Canadian companies from 2010, the year marking the fifth anniversary of 
the application of Canadian board regulations. Board data were collected from executive circulars and notices 
(on www.sedar.com), political connections from a study of corporate websites, Google and BoardEx data base, 
and financial data from Compustat. After companies with missing data were removed, the final sample came to 
199 companies. Table 1 provides some of the sample’s characteristics. 
 
Table 1. Sample selection 
 Number 
S&P\TSX 300  258 
Financial firms  33 
Mergers and acquisitions  4 
Missing data  22 
Final sample  199 
 
4.2 Analysis Model and Variables 
4.2.1 Analysis Model  
We chose a General Linear Model (GLM) to test the following: 
Financial performance = Political Connections + Compliance with Board Regulations + Firm Size + Debt + 
US Listing + Industry + (Political Connections*Compliance with Board Regulations)        (1) 
4.2.2 Dependent Variable: Financial Performance 
In the literature, financial performance is measured in a number of ways; we chose the three main methods, 
return on assets (earnings before interest and tax on total assets), return on equity (earnings before interest and 
tax on equity) and market-to-book value. 
4.2.3 Independent Variables 
1)-Political Connections: Across the literature, firm political connections are also defined in a number of ways. 
According to Faccio (2006) and others (Boubakri, El Ghoul & Saffar, 2012), a firm is politically connected if its 
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majority shareholder or one of its officers or directors is a member of parliament, a minister or government 
leader, or is politically connected (through family ties or friendships, for example). It is also considered 
politically connected if it contributes financially to a political party, according to Dinc (2005), Claessens et al. 
(2008) and Goldman et al. (2009). The present study looks at the firm’s political connections by way of its 
directors, using criteria found in the literature (particularly Faccio, 2006; Goldman et al., 2009) and applying 
them to a single director. Thus, the variable takes the value of 1 if at least one director is or has been a member of 
the government or parliament, has contributed financially to a party or is a member of a political party. 
2)-Compliance with Canadian board regulations: level of conformance to Canadian regulations on the board of 
directors was measured through a nine-point scale (see Appendix containing the measurement grid), consistent 
with other studies that used similar indices (Gombers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Defond, Hann & Hu, 2005; Bhagat 
and Bolton, 2008). The scale had been validated previously by financial experts and used in other studies 
(Khemakhem & Naciri, 2013; Khemakhem, Baillargeon & Gélinas, 2013). It provides the advantage of more 
accurate global measurement and comparability among firms (Bhagat, Bolton & Romano, 2008). For this study, 
an objective frame of reference tailored to the Canadian context was selected: National Policy 58-201 and 
National Instrument 52-110, adopted by financial market authorities in Canada. National Policy 58-201 provides 
examples of governance best practices such as board and chairperson independence, separate meetings for 
independent directors and existence of a written charter (Note 3) and a code of ethics. This regulation provides a 
source of compliance points in regard to board of directors and committee characteristics (see Appendix 
containing the measurement grid). The scale was further enriched by National Instrument 52-110 Audit 
Committees, stipulating the use of independent external auditors and an independent audit committee and 
providing a source of compliance points in regard to audit committees and the independence of board members 
and committees. 
4.2.4 Control Variables  
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) demonstrated that the following variables characterizing the firm 
have an impact on its governance: size (measured by the logarithm of its assets), long-term debt divided by total 
assets, and industry sector. Similar to Aggarwal et al. (2009), the current investigation used the following control 
variables: firm size (measured by the logarithm of sales), relative indebtedness (measured by long-term debt 
divided by total assets), and industry sector (measured by a dummy variable coded 1 to 9). Sector is the firm’s 
industry group as defined in SEDAR. Nine sectors were identified and coded 1 to 9. Given that a number of 
Canadian firms were subject to US regulations as a result of being listed on the US stock exchange, and that US 
regulations are considered to be considerably more stringent, the firm’s listing on the US market was included as 
a control variable (US listing). US listing takes the value of 1 if the firm is subject to US stock exchange 
regulations, and 0 otherwise.   
5. Analysis Results  
5.1 ANOVA Results 
5.1.1 Political Connections and Compliance with Board Regulations 
There is a significant difference between being politically connected and complying with board regulations (see 
Table 2). Furthermore, the fact of being politically connected does not influence compliance with board 
regulations. In fact, Table 3 shows that politically connected as well as non-connected firms comply with board 
regulations. This finding corroborates the results of Khemakhem and Dicko’s study (2013) of a similar Canadian 
sample. 
 
Table 2. ANOVA–political connections 
 Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Sig 
Compliance  
Between groups 5.570 1 5.570 4.658 0.032 
Within groups 229.589 192 1.196   
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Table 3. Compliance * political connections 
 
Political Connections 
Total 0 1 
Compliance  
4 Total number 0 1 1 
% in Compliance 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 0.0% 1.6% 0.5% 
5 Total number 5 0 5 
% in Compliance 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 3.8% 0.0% 2.6% 
6 Total number 17 3 20 
% in Compliance 85.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 12.8% 4.9% 10.3% 
7 Total number 31 10 41 
% in Compliance 75.6% 24.4% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 23.3% 16.4% 21.1% 
8 Total number 42 24 66 
% in Compliance 63.6% 36.4% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 31.6% 39.3% 34.0% 
9 Total number 38 23 61 
% in Compliance 62.3% 37.7% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 28.6% 37.7% 31.4% 
Total 
Total number 133 61 194 
% in Compliance 68.6% 31.4% 100.0% 
% with Political Connections 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
5.1.2 Political Connections, Compliance with Board Regulations and US Listing 
Khemakhem and Dicko (2013) found that US market listing influences Canadian firms’ compliance with 
governance regulations in view of the greater stringency of US regulations. According to Table 4, no significant 
differences were found between politically connected vs. non-connected firms among those listed on the US 
market; in other words, being listed on the US market did not influence the firms’ political connections 
behaviour. 
 
Table 4. ANOVA – US listing 
 Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Sig 
Political Connections 
Between groups 0.095 1 0.095 0.437  0.510 
Within groups 41.057 189  0.217   
Total 41.152 190    
Compliance  
Between groups 10.022 1 10.022 8.358  0.004 
Within groups 232.611 194  1.199   
Total 242.633 195    
 
Interestingly, 34.2% of US listed firms were politically connected and 65.8% were not, while 29.7% of firms not 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics on politically connected firms according to their listing on the US market 
 
Political Connections 
Total 0 1 
US Listing 
0 Total number 83 35 118 
% US listed 70.3% 29.7% 100.0% 
% politically connected 63.4% 58.3% 61.8% 
1 Total number 48 25 73 
% US listed 65.8% 34.2% 100.0% 
% politically connected 36.6% 41.7% 38.2% 
Total 
Total number 131 60 191 
% US listed 68.6% 31.4% 100.0% 
% politically connected 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
% in total 68.6% 31.4% 100.0% 
 
In view of the fact that US listing seems to influence firm compliance with board regulations, there is a very 
significant difference between US listed and unlisted firms in terms of their compliance with board regulations. 
This finding is consistent with past studies (Khemakhem & Dicko, 2013) which showed that US corporate 
governance regulations are more stringent than Canadian regulations. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics on compliance with board regulations and US listings 
 
Compliance 
Total 4 5 6 7 8 9 
US Listing 
0 Total number 1 4 17 28 38 33 121 
% US Listed 0.8% 3.3% 14.0% 23.1% 31.4% 27.3% 100.0% 
% in Compliance 100.0% 66.7% 89.5% 68.3% 57.6% 52.4% 61.7% 
1 Total number 0 2 2 13 28 30 75 
% US Listed 0.0% 2.7% 2.7% 17.3% 37.3% 40.0% 100.0% 
% in Compliance 0.0% 33.3% 10.5% 31.7% 42.4% 47.6% 38.3% 
Total 
Total number 1 6 19 41 66 63 196 
% US Listed 0.5% 3.1% 9.7% 20.9% 33.7% 32.1% 100.0% 
% in Compliance 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
5.1.3 Political Connections, Compliance with Board Regulations and Financial Performance 
5.1.3.1 Political Connections and Financial Performance 
According to ANOVA results, there is a significant difference between politically connected and non-connected 
firms in terms of financial performance (measured by ROA, ROE and MTB). Therefore, political connections 
appear to influence firm financial performance. This finding corroborates some previous studies (Dicko & 
Breton, 2013a; 2013b; Dicko & El Ibrami, 2013). 
 
Table 7. ANOVA–political connections 
 Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Sig 
ROA 
Between groups  0.024 1  0.024 6.318  0.013 
Within groups 0.729 192  0.004   
Total 0.753 193    
ROE 
Within groups 1.639 1  1.639 3.289  0.071 
Inside groups 95.684 192   0.498   
Total 97.323 193    
MTB 
Between groups 11.241 1 11.241 3.563  0.061 
Within groups 605.799 192  3.155   
Total 617.040 193    
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5.1.3.2 Compliance with Board Regulations and Financial Performance 
In terms of financial performance, no significant difference was found between firms that comply with board 
regulations and those that do not (ROA, ROE, MTB). Hence, complying with board regulations does not 
influence firm financial performance. Complying with board regulations does not add value to firm. 
 
Table 8. ANOVA–compliance with board regulations 
 Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Sig 
ROA 
Between groups 0.007 5 0.001 0.323 0.899 
Within groups 0.807 193 0.004   
Total 0.814 198    
ROE 
Between groups  1.248 5 0.250 0.500 0.776 
Within groups 96.352 193 0.499   
Total 97.600 198    
MTB 
Between groups 7.365 5 1.473 0.462 0.804 
Within groups 615320 193 0.3188   
Total 622685 198    
 
5.2 Results of Correlation Analyses 
According to correlation test results, compliance with board regulations is not correlated to any of the dependent 
variables (ROA, ROE, MTB), while political connections are significantly correlated to ROA. More importantly, 
the interaction between political connections and compliance with board regulations is significantly correlated to 
ROA and ROE. These correlation results confirm our research hypotheses. 
 
Table 9. Pearson correlation results 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1  Debt 1        
2  Industry 0.490** 1       
3  Firm Size 0.093 0.079 1      
4  Political Connections 0.106 0.073 0.230** 1     
5  Compliance with Board Regulations 0.169* 0.034 0.110 0.154* 1    
6  ROA 0.041 0.119 0.354** 0.178* 0.022 1   
7  ROE 0.133 0.214** 0.126 0.130 0.070 0.210** 1  
8  MTB -0.151* -0.131 -0.278** -0.135 -0.036 -0.028 0.015 1 
9  Political Connections*Compliance 0.116 0.064 0.215** 0.989** 0.228** 0.177* 0.145* -0.134 1
Note. ** Correlation significant at 0.01 (2-tailed). 
* Correlation significant at 0.05 (2-tailed). 
 
5.3 Results of GLM Analyses 
Table 10 shows that the effect of compliance with board regulations on financial performance is not significant, 
whereas the effect of political connections on financial performance is positive and very significant. Moreover, 
the effect of the interaction between political connections and compliance with board regulations on financial 
performance is positive and very significant. More importantly, this last effect is greater and more significant 
than the previous two, confirming our research hypotheses. 
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Table 10. Results of multivariate tests (dependent variables: ROA, ROE and MTB) 
 Value F DF DF Error Sig 
Constant 0.141 7.785 3.000 142.000 0.000 
Firm size 0.158 8.893 3.000 142.000 0.000 
Debt  0.020 0.990 3.000 142.000 0.399 
Compliance  0.015 0.700 3.000 142.000 0.554 
Political Connections*Compliance 0.087 4.514 3.000 142.000 0.005 
Industry  0.278 1.337 33.000 432.000 0.104 
Political Connections 0.076 3.874 3.000 142.000 0.011 
US Listing 0.035 1.716 3.000 142.000 0.166 
ROA Model R2  0.263  Adjusted R2  0.053  
ROE Model R2  0.329  Adjusted R2  0.138  
MTB Model R2 0.251  Adjusted R2   0.038  
ROA Corrected Model Sig 0.168     
ROE Corrected Model Sig 0.010     
MTB Corrected Model Sig 0.241     
ROA Model Constant sig 0.832     
ROE Model Constant sign 0.008     
MTB Model Constant sig 0.000     
 
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study investigated the combined impact of political connections and compliance with board regulations on 
the financial performance of Canadian firms. In terms of effects on financial performance, the results show that 
compliance with board regulations does not have a significant impact, political connections have a positive and 
very significant impact, and political connections and compliance with board regulations together have a more 
positive and significant impact than each factor individually. Our research hypotheses are therefore confirmed.  
The results of this study bring a fresh perspective to the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
financial performance. The literature over the past few decades has focused by and large on the board of 
directors’ role and its impact on firm financial performance, but with no consensus among authors. With this in 
mind, we felt that further research should look at relational as well as structural aspects. Some studies used 
sociology theories, particularly social capital and resource dependence theory, to demonstrate that the board of 
directors is not only a combination of committees but also a set of social relationships and connections that can 
be used in a firm’s best interest (Dicko, 2011; Dicko & Breton, 2013a; 2013b; Dicko & El Ibrami, 2013). The 
current study builds on these research efforts. 
It has been argued (Faccio, 2006; Dicko, 2011) that politically connected firms are subject to less oversight and 
accordingly conform less to corporate governance regulations. However, our study demonstrates two main ideas: 
one, the boards of directors of Canadian firms have political connections, and two, these connections create 
value especially when the firms comply with board regulations. In the case of politically connected firms, 
compliance is positively valued because it is not expected from them in the first place. 
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Notes 
Note 1. Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, Where Were the Directors? – 
Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada, Toronto, 1994. 
Note 2. Sarbanes –Oxley Act, 2002. 
Note 3. The charter should define the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors. 
 
Appendix: Board Compliance Index 
 Practices  Measures 
Board  Board Independence  The board should have a majority of independent directors. 
Chairperson of the Board 
Independence  
The chairperson of the board should be an independent director.  
 
Non-duality of the 
Chairperson  
The president of the company is not the chairperson of the board. 
Code of Business Conduct 
and Ethics 
The board should adopt a written code of business conduct and ethics. 
 
Board Charter or Mandate  The board should adopt a written mission statement. 
Regular Board Assessments The board should be regularly assessed regarding its effectiveness. 
Orientation and Continuing 
Education 
The board should provide continuing education opportunities for all directors. 
Meetings of Independent 
Directors 
The independent directors should hold regularly scheduled meetings without non-independent 
directors and members of management present. 
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